

ship gives each of them an incentive to make the major investment himself rather than let the profitable association fall apart. In every exchange transaction, finally, each participant hopes to gain much at little cost, yet to profit at all both must come to some agreement. The coexistence of conflicting and common interests in all these social associations means that associates always have first choices that conflict but last choices that are identical, and the first choice of either is the second-last of the other, though it may still be preferable to any available alternative.<sup>44</sup> These preferences, however, are continually modified in the process of maneuvering between partners and exploring alternative opportunities until stable social relations have become crystallized.

Aside from these interpersonal conflicts, there is also the intrapersonal conflict between the individual's desire to gain social approval and support and his desire to gain instrumental advantage in his social associations. This conflict is usually resolved by obtaining intrinsic support primarily from some associates and extrinsic benefits largely from others. The multigroup affiliations of individuals in modern society facilitate this solution, permitting them to pursue their advantage without regard for approval in one social context and to elicit approval and support by their generosity and supportiveness in another, for example, in their business and in their family, respectively. Social approval has less pervasive significance as a restraining force in complex societies than in simpler ones, because the multiplicity of groups and the possible mobility between them in complex societies enables deviants of nearly all sorts to escape from the impact of community disapproval by finding a subgroup of like-minded persons where they can gain approval. Impersonal restraints are, therefore, of special importance in modern societies, and a basic source of impersonal restraint is power.

<sup>44</sup> See the chart on p. 45.

## \* FIVE

### *Differentiation of Power*

What about COERCIVE  
DEATH TH

[Power] is thus both awful and fragile, and can dominate a continent, only in the end to be blown down by a whisper. To destroy it, nothing more is required than to be indifferent to its threats, and to prefer other goods to those which it promises. Nothing less, however, is required also.

R. H. TAWNEY, *Equality*

"Power' (*Macht*) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance," according to Weber.<sup>1</sup> Tawney's definition similarly centers on imposing one's will on others, except that he explicitly directs attention to the asymmetry of power relations: "Power may be defined as the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires, and to prevent his own conduct being modified in the manner in which he does not."<sup>2</sup>

Broadly defined, power refers to all kinds of influence between persons or groups, including those exercised in exchange transactions, where one induces others to accede to his wishes by rewarding them for doing so. Neither Weber nor Tawney, however, used the term that broadly. Although the customer technically imposes his will upon the jeweler when he makes him surrender a diamond ring by paying for it, this situation clearly should not be confused with that of the

<sup>1</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 152.

<sup>2</sup> R. H. Tawney, *Equality*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1931, p. 229.

gangster who forces the jeweler to hand over the ring at the point of a gun. Physical coercion, or its threat, is the polar case of power, but other negative sanctions, or the threat of exercising them, are usually also effective means of imposing one's will on others. People can be made to do things for fear of losing their jobs, of being ostracized, of having to pay fines, or of losing social standing. This suggests a distinction between coercive power, which rests on the deterrent effect of negative sanctions, and influence based on rewards, as that characteristic of exchange transactions.<sup>3</sup>

Defining power as control through negative sanctions implies that an individual exercises power when he gets another to perform a service by threatening to take 100 dollars from him if he refuses, whereas he does not when he gets the other to perform the same service by promising him 100 dollars for it. The objection may be raised that the net difference is the same in both cases—the other is 100 dollars better off if he performs the service than if he does not—but this objection does not seem valid. The crucial factor is the baseline from which an individual starts when another seeks to influence him, and the only difference between punishments and rewards is in relation to this initial baseline, whether he is worse or better off than he was before the transaction started. The necessity to avert a loss is probably also experienced as more of an external compulsion than the temptation to make a gain. A more serious objection, however, is that the baseline itself is obscured once rewards become recurrent.

Regular rewards make recipients dependent on the supplier and subject to his power, since they engender expectations that make their discontinuation a punishment. A person who has a job is rewarded for performing his duties by his earnings, and as his wages are positive sanctions it seems at first that no power is involved in terms of the definition presented. However, being fired from a job cannot plausibly be considered to constitute merely the absence of rewards; it clearly is a punishing experience. The threat of being fired is a

<sup>3</sup> This corresponds to John P. R. French, Jr., and Bertram Raven's distinction between coercive and reward power, in addition to which they specified three types not contingent on external sanctions (legitimate, referent, and expert power); "The Bases of Social Power," in Dorwin Cartwright, *Studies in Social Power*, Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1959, pp. 150–167. Talcott Parsons makes a parallel distinction between coercive power that rests on deterrence through negative sanctions and inducements in exchange transactions that rest on positive sanctions; "On the Concept of Influence," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (1963), 43–45, and "On the Concept of Political Power," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 107 (1963), 238–239.

negative sanction that gives an employer power over his employees, enabling him to enforce their compliance with his directives. Regular rewards create expectations that redefine the baseline in terms of which positive sanctions are distinguished from negative ones. The air we breathe is not conceived by us to be a special reward, nor is the freedom to move about the streets as we please, but being suffocated or imprisoned is experienced as a punishment. Correspondingly, a man who has reason to expect to remain in his job does not think of his regular earnings as distinctive rewards, and the loss of his income is a punishment for him. Only a raise in income is a specific reward, although even raises that occur regularly come to be expected, and in these cases failure to receive a raise tends to be experienced as a punishment and may be so intended by the employer.

The definition of power should be amplified, therefore, to read that it is the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either in the forms of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment, inasmuch as the former as well as the latter constitute, in effect, a negative sanction.<sup>4</sup> Three further implications should be noted. First, following Parsons, the concept of power is used to refer to an individual's or group's ability *recurrently* to impose his or its will on others, not to a single instance of influencing a decision of theirs, however important.<sup>5</sup> Second, the punishment threatened for resistance, provided it is severe, makes power a compelling force, yet there is an element of voluntarism in power—the punishment could be chosen in preference to compliance, and it sometimes is—which distinguishes it from the limiting case of direct physical coercion.<sup>6</sup> Finally, power is conceptualized as inherently asymmetrical and as resting on the *net* ability of a person to withhold rewards from and apply punishments to others—the ability that remains after the re-

<sup>4</sup> A technical problem of definition, to which Arnold Kaufman has called my attention, arises if there is disagreement between superior and subordinates as to whether a given reward is regularly supplied or not. For example, an employer may think of a Christmas bonus as a special reward, whereas his employees have come to think of it as part of their regular income and to consider not receiving the bonus a penalty. It is necessary to decide, depending on the purpose at hand, whether the defining criterion is the subordinates' expectation or the superior's intent.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 237–238.

<sup>6</sup> Parsons' emphasis on legitimacy in this connection (*ibid.*, pp. 236–244), however, seems to confound the distinction between power and the special case of authority, which will be discussed in chapter viii.

straints they can impose on him have been taken into account. Its source is one-sided dependence. Interdependence and mutual influence of equal strength indicate lack of power.

### *Unilateral Dependence and Obligations*

By supplying services in demand to others, a person establishes power over them. If he regularly renders needed services they cannot readily obtain elsewhere, others become dependent on and obligated to him for these services, and unless they can furnish other benefits to him that produce interdependence by making him equally dependent on them, their unilateral dependence obligates them to comply with his requests lest he cease to continue to meet their needs. Providing needed benefits others cannot easily do without is undoubtedly the most prevalent way of attaining power, though not the only one, since it can also be attained by threatening to deprive others of benefits they currently enjoy unless they submit. The threat of punishment, although it exerts the most severe restraints, creates the dependence that is the root of power indirectly, as it were, while recurrent essential rewards that can be withheld do so directly. The government that furnishes needed protection to its citizens, the employer who provides needed jobs to his employees, and the profession that supplies needed services to the community, all make the others dependent on them and potentially subject to their power.

Emerson has presented a schema for examining "power-dependence" relations and their consequences, which can be reformulated to specify the conditions that produce the imbalance of power itself.<sup>7</sup> Individuals who need a service another has to offer have the following alternatives: *First, they can supply him with a service* that he wants badly enough to induce him to offer his service in return, though only if they have the resources required for doing so; this will lead to reciprocal exchanges. *Second, they may obtain the needed service elsewhere*, assuming that there are alternative suppliers; this also will lead to reciprocal exchanges but in different partnerships. *Third, they can coerce him to furnish the service*, provided they are

capable of doing so, in which case they would establish domination over him. *Fourth, they may learn to resign themselves to do without this service*, possibly finding some substitute for it, which would require that they change the values that determine their needs. Finally, if they are not able or willing to choose any of these alternatives, they have no other choice but to comply with his wishes, since he can make continued supply of the needed service contingent on their compliance. In the situation specified, the supply of services inevitably generates power. The absence of the first four alternatives defines the conditions of power in general.

This schema can be employed to indicate the conditions of social independence, the requirements of power, the issues in power conflicts, and their structural implications. The conditions of social independence are characterized by the availability of the first four alternatives, which enables people to evade the fifth one of dependence on services from a given source. First, strategic resources promote independence. Specifically, a person who has all the resources required as effective inducements for others to furnish him with the services and benefits he needs is protected against becoming dependent on anyone. The possession of generalized rewards, such as money, is evidently of major significance in this connection, although wealth is not a perfect safeguard against dependence, since many benefits a person may want, such as fame or love, cannot be obtained for money but only with other resources.

The fact that there are alternative sources from which a needed service can be obtained is a second condition that fosters independence. If there is only one employer in a community, or only one expert consultant in a work group, others are likely to become dependent on him. The situation, however, does not have to be that extreme. As a matter of fact, any commitment to a social relationship entails a degree of dependence by excluding alternatives. An employee presumably remains in a job either because alternative employment opportunities are less attractive to him or because his investment in this job is so great that moving to another would be too costly for him. Whatever the reason, his lack of equally preferable alternatives makes him dependent on his employer.<sup>8</sup> The degree of dependence

<sup>7</sup> Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (1962), 31-41. Suggestive as the underlying conception is, the focus on balancing operations is unfortunate and somewhat confusing inasmuch as it diverts attention from the analysis of power imbalance. His schema deals with the balancing operations consequent to given differences in power-dependence, whereas the reformulation derives power imbalances from the conditions of exchange.

<sup>8</sup> The counterdependence of the small employer on the employee's services may create interdependence and neutralize the small employer's power, but the large employer is not so much dependent on single employees as on a labor force whose turnover can and must be taken into account in management, and his independence of any one employee sustains his power over all of them, unless it is reduced by their collective action.

of individuals on a person who supplies valued services is a function of the difference between their value and that of the second-best alternative open to them. The more employees prefer their own job to any possible alternative, the more dependent are they on their employer and the more power does he have over them. The employer can cut the salary of employees who are very dependent on their job, assign them unpleasant duties, or force them to work harder, and they have no choice but to accept the decisions and to comply. Yet by doing so the employer makes the job less attractive to the employees and other employment opportunities relatively more attractive, decreasing the difference between the present job and alternatives, and thus reducing his employees' dependence on him and his power over them. Generally, the greater the difference between the benefits an individual supplies to others and those they can obtain elsewhere, the greater is his power over them likely to be. Hence, others can increase their independence of a person who has power over them simply by accepting fewer benefits from him—no more than they can get for their services elsewhere—except that this is often not so simple for them.<sup>9</sup>

A third condition of independence is the ability to use coercive force to compel others to dispense needed benefits or services. The inability to use force may be due to weakness or to normative restraints that effectively prohibit resort to coercion, or it may be due to the fact that the desired benefit loses its significance if given under duress, as is the case for love and for social approval. Superior coercive power makes people relatively independent of others inasmuch as power includes the ability to prevent others from interfering with one's conduct. Since there is strength in numbers, independence can be won through forming coalitions capable of enforcing demands.<sup>10</sup>

A lack of need for various services constitutes the fourth condition of independence. The fewer the wants and needs of an individual, the less dependent he is on others to meet them. Needs, however, do not remain constant. By providing individuals with goods and services that increase their satisfaction, their level of expectations tends to be raised, and while they were previously satisfied without these benefits,

<sup>9</sup> Accepting a job at a higher salary than one can command in the market, buying from an acquaintance at wholesale prices, gaining acceptance in a more eminent group than one's achievements warrant, and generally obtaining any recurrent benefit that is superior to what could be obtained elsewhere entails dependence and loss of power.

<sup>10</sup> Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

they are now desirous of continuing to obtain them. The development of new needs in this fashion underlies the increasing consumer demand that is an essential element in an expanding economy. But emergent needs serve this function by strengthening the dependence of people on those who can supply the resources required to meet these needs, notably employers. Religious and political ideals derive their driving force in large part from imbuing adherents with values that make the satisfaction of material wants comparatively unimportant and that, consequently, lessen men's dependence on those who can supply material benefits. By reducing material needs, revolutionary ideologies become a source of independent strength and resistance to power.

The fourfold schema can also help to delineate the strategies required to attain and sustain power, which are complementary to the conditions of independence just discussed. To achieve power over others with his resources, a person must prevent others from choosing any of the first four alternatives, thereby compelling them to comply with his directives as a condition for obtaining the needed benefits at his command. This requires, first, that he remain indifferent to the benefits they can offer him in exchange for his. The strategies of power designed to preserve this indifference include denying others access to resources that are vital for the welfare of a group or individual, for example, by fighting attempts of working-class parties to take over the government; securing needed benefits from outside sources rather than subordinates, as illustrated by the gang leader's disinclination to borrow money from his more affluent followers;<sup>11</sup> and encouraging competition among the suppliers of essential service, for instance, by opposing the formation of unions that would restrict competition for jobs among workers.

A second requirement of power is to assure the continued dependence of others on the services one has to supply by barring access to alternative suppliers of these services. Monopolization of needed rewards is the typical means of achieving this purpose. The only firm in town where jobs can be found, the only child on the block who has a bicycle, the political society that is the sole source of national security and glory, the church that is the only avenue to salvation, and the police that alone can offer protection against violence—all these have power due to their monopoly over important benefits.

The ability to prevent others from resorting to coercive force to

<sup>11</sup> William F. Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (2d ed.), University of Chicago Press, 1955, pp. 257–258.

effect their demands is a third prerequisite of maintaining power. Discouraging coalitions among subordinates that would enable them to extract demands is a strategy that serves this end, as is blocking their access to political power. Such organizations as unions and working-class parties have two analytically distinct, though actually inseparable, functions in the fight against existing powers. Their success threatens those in positions of power, on the one hand, by making them dependent for essential services on these organizations (for example, for labor supply) and, on the other, by subjecting them to their coercive power (for instance, the union's sit-down strike or the executive power of the labor-party government). Obstructing such coalitions, therefore, protects power against being undermined either by withholding vital services or by employing coercive force. Probably the most important strategies for safeguarding the power that rests on the possession of important resources, however, are support for law and order and resistance against political control of exchange processes. These defenses protect the power potential that resides in superior vital resources not only from the threat of violence but also from being curbed by the legitimate power of the state.

Fourth, power depends on people's needs for the benefits those in power have to offer. Materialistic values, which make money and what it can buy of great significance, strengthen the power of employers. Patriotic ideals, which identify people with the success of their country in war and peace, fortify the power of the government. Religious convictions, which make the blessings of a church and the spiritual counsel of its representatives rewards of great saliency, reinforce the power of church dignitaries. Revolutionary ideologies, which define the progress of a radical movement as inherently valuable for its members, bestow power on the movement's leadership. Groups and individuals in power have a stake in helping to perpetuate and spread the relevant social values and in opposing counter-ideologies that depreciate these values. Dominant groups whose power rests on different social values have some conflicting interests, therefore, although their common interest in preserving the existing power structure may well override these differences.

The conflict between the powerful (who have an interest in fortifying their power) and the people over whom they have power (who have an interest in strengthening their independence) centers around four types of issues, which again correspond to the four alternatives outlined. First, there is the issue of the resources of subordinates. If their resources were sufficient to obtain the benefits they need in exchange for them, they would cease to be subject to the power of

the others. Granted that every single subordinate's resources are inadequate for this purpose, the issue becomes that of pooling the resources of all subordinates who confront a superior or group of superiors to extract demands from him or them. The second issue is that of the alternative opportunities available to subordinates for obtaining needed benefits. Competition among superiors for the services of subordinates increases the subordinates' independence, whereas monopolistic practices increase the superiors' power. These two conflicts are complementary, since the question in both cases is the degree of collective organization permissible to restrain free competition, although it is the organization of the powerless that would husband their resources in one case, and the organization of the powerful that would monopolize needed benefits in the other.

The third conflict is political. At issue here is the use of coercive force in the fight against powers based on superior resources. The prototype is the conflict over the use of the legitimate coercive power of the state to regulate exchange transactions and restrict power that rests on economic strength. Fourth, there is the ideological conflict between social values that intensify the need for the services the powerful have to offer and counterideologies that mitigate this need. In the process of decreasing the need for some services, however, radical ideologies increase the need for others—namely, those that contribute to the reform movement—with the result that ideologies make adherents less dependent on the power of some but more dependent on the power of others.

Finally, tracing the implications of each of the four alternatives leads to the analysis of basic problems of social structure. First, the fact that benefits can be obtained by reciprocating for them with others directs attention to the study of exchange processes and the distribution of resources. Second, the exploration of alternative opportunities points to the investigation of the emerging exchange structures, the competitive processes in them, the going rates of exchange, and the normative standards that tend to develop. Third, the study of coercive power raises questions concerning the establishment of coalitions and organizations to mobilize power, the differentiation of power in social structures, and the processes that govern the struggle over political power in a society.<sup>12</sup> Fourth, the ability to get along without something originally needed calls attention to the modifica-

<sup>12</sup> These could also be considered to be implications of the fifth alternative. The third and fifth alternatives are complementary, as they are concerned with power from the perspectives of the two different parties.



tions of social values that occur under various conditions, the formation of new ideologies, and conflicts between ideologies.<sup>13</sup>

The main points of the entire discussion presented are summarized in this schema:

<i>Alternatives to Compliance</i>	<i>Conditions of Independence</i>	<i>Requirements of Power</i>	<i>Structural Implications</i>
1. Supply inducements	Strategic resources	Indifference to what others offer	Exchange and distribution of resources
2. Obtain elsewhere	Available alternatives	Monopoly over what others need	Competition and exchange rates
3. Take by force	Coercive force	Law and order	Organization and differentiation
4. Do without	Ideals lessening needs	Materialistic and other relevant values	Ideology formation

Dependence on the benefits a person can supply does not make others subject to his power but gives him only potential power over them. Realization of this power requires that he actually supply the benefits or commit himself to do so. In a technical sense, we are dependent on all employers who are in a position to offer us better jobs than those we have, but these employers have no power over us, while our employer has the power to command our compliance with his directives, because the salary and other benefits he furnishes obligate us to comply lest we cease to continue to receive them. He alone can withdraw from us benefits to which we have become accustomed, whereas other employers can only tempt us with greater rewards.

<sup>13</sup> Some aspects of the first problem have been discussed in chapter iv; some of the second will be discussed in this chapter and in chapters vi and vii; of the third, in chapters viii and ix (as well as in the present one); and of the fourth, in chapters ix and xi.

The ability to provide superior benefits than are available elsewhere, in a situation where these benefits are needed and cannot be extracted by force, constitutes a very strong claim to power, although not a completely inescapable one. If the power demands are too severe, relinquishing these benefits may be preferable to yielding to the demands. Moreover, a person's or group's resources may not be adequate to obligate others to comply. For these reasons coercive force, which can hardly be resisted, is important as a last resort for exercising power over individuals who cannot otherwise be made to yield. Whereas physical force is a perfect protection against power—killing a man or incarcerating him disposes of his threat—it is an imperfect tool for exercising power, since people can choose even death over compliance. Hence, coercive force differs only in degree from the power that rests on the supply of needed benefits, albeit an important degree.

### *Competition for Status*

Competition arises in the process of social integration and gives rise to differentiation of status in groups, as noted in chapter two. At this point processes of social differentiation in groups will be traced in greater detail, focusing on the ultimate differentiation of power and drawing attention to some parallels between the differentiating processes in face-to-face groups and those in complex structures.

The initial competition in newly forming groups is for participation time. Whatever attracts individuals to the group, whether they seek to gain simply acceptance, social support, respect, or positions of leadership and power, obtaining these social rewards requires opportunities for proving oneself worthy of them. Others must devote time to interact with and listen to an individual to enable him to impress them with his outstanding qualities, but time is scarce since not everyone can be attended to at once. Time, then, is a generalized means in the competition for a variety of social rewards, equivalent in this respect to profitable sales in economic competition, which also are needed whether the aim is to distribute profits, increase assets, buy new equipment, or achieve a dominant position in the market. The unequal distribution of speaking time produces an initial differentiation that gives some an advantage in subsequent competitive processes, just as the unequal distribution of sales among firms does.

The group allocates time among various members in accordance with their estimated abilities to make contributions to its welfare

based on the initial impressions. In a discussion group confronted with the task of resolving some issue or solving some problem, for example, most speaking time is allocated to those who appear most likely to advance the solution. Having speaking time available, however, is not sufficient for an individual's purpose, whatever it is; he must properly use the opportunity it provides to obtain social rewards from the rest of the group. The member who makes important contributions to the discussion is first rewarded by the approval of others, by having them increasingly turn to him for his suggestions and for his approval of theirs, and if his suggestions continue to prove viable, he is further rewarded by their respect for his abilities. The group member who makes lesser contributions—for instance, relieving the tensions generated by conflicts of opinions through his good humor and congeniality—is likely to earn the approval and acceptance of others, though not their high respect.

The object of competition shifts in this process from having time made available for originating interaction with others first to receiving interaction from them that express their positive evaluation of oneself, and then from there to commanding their respect and compliance or, at least, earning their acceptance and social support. Lack of success in the earlier competition for speaking time puts an individual at a disadvantage in the later competition for respect and leadership. Once competition has become refocused on social status, however, speaking time is no longer of central concern and there are even occasions when it is most advantageous to refrain from talking. These processes reveal again some close parallels to economic competition. Firms must compete for sales to maximize profits, and great profits are necessary to compete for a dominant position in the industry. But once a dominant position is the central focus of competitive endeavors considerations other than profitable sales must be taken into account, such as possible anti-trust action of the government. Indeed a situation may arise in which the maintenance of a firm's dominant position is best served by refraining from further increasing sales. Gary's management of United States Steel is reported to have followed such a policy of restraint, in sharp contrast to Carnegie's earlier management under which the firm achieved its dominant position.<sup>14</sup>

Earning superior status in a group requires not merely impressing others with outstanding abilities but actually using these abilities to make contributions to the achievement of the collective goals of the

group or the individual goals of its members. It requires, for example, suggestions that advance the solution of the common problem of a discussion group or advice that helps individual colleagues in a work group to improve their performance. Having his suggestions usually followed by others is a mark of respect that raises an individual's social standing in a group, while others' social standing simultaneously suffers for two reasons, because they often follow his suggestions and because their own are rarely accepted. Initially, the high respect of the rest of the group may be sufficient reward for the contributions a group member makes, and short-term discussion groups in laboratories may never advance beyond this stage, but in the long run it is likely to prove insufficient. Since the value of a person's approval and respect is a function of his own social standing, the process of recurrently paying respect to others depreciates its value. Hence, respect often does not remain an adequate compensation for contributions that entail costs in time and effort to the one who makes them, such as assistance with complex problems. Those who benefit from such instrumental help, therefore, become obligated to reciprocate in some other way, and deferring to the wishes of the group member who supplies the help is typically the only thing the others can do to repay him. As a result of these processes in which the contributions of some come to command the compliance of others, a differentiated power structure develops.

Exchange relations become differentiated from competitive ones concurrently with the differentiation of social status that emerges in the course of competition. In rudimentary social structures, all members compete with each other for the output of each other. Thus, each group member competes with all the other members for the respect of these same other members. As status begins to become differentiated, those whose abilities win the respect of others go on to compete among themselves for positions of power and leadership, whereas those who must acknowledge inferiority by paying respect have no chance in this continuing competition. In consequence, exchange relations are no longer identical with competitive ones. The high-status members furnish instrumental assistance to the low-status ones in exchange for their respect and compliance, which help the high-status members in their competition for a dominant position in the group. Without the contribution of the highs to the performance of collective or individual tasks, the lows would be deprived of the benefits that accrue to them from improved performance and joint achievements. Without the compliance and support of the lows, the highs cannot attain positions of power and leadership. Sometimes the members of

<sup>14</sup> Charles H. Hession, S. M. Miller, and Curwen Stoddart, *The Dynamics of the American Economy*, New York: Knopf, 1956, pp. 193–208.

work groups compete in their performance. If this is the case, the exchange relations between the highs and the lows that develop out of competitive relations as the result of status differentiation help both the highs in their competition for superior status and the lows in their competition for better performance.

These processes, in which competitive and exchange relations become differentiated in the course of the development of increasing status differences, are also manifest in entire communities, as the class structure of the Ifugao in the Philippines illustrates.<sup>15</sup> There are three broad classes, and class position depends primarily on wealth. Everybody competes for wealth as a means of improving his social status. The middle class is composed of property holders who work on the land, ranging from those with such poor land that they are continually threatened by bankruptcy, which would put them into the propertyless lower class, to those with such large holdings and surplus incomes that they have some chance to move into the upper class. In effect, families in the lower-middle class compete for staying in the middle class, while families in the upper-middle class compete for entry into the upper class, and since they are too far apart to compete, exchange relations develop between these two strata that serve the members of each in their distinct competitive struggles. Members of the upper-middle class often furnish loans, at interest, to those of the lower-middle class, which help them to retain their land and thus stay in the middle class, and which increase the wealth of the upper-middle class and thus their chances of moving into the upper class. It is evident that the situation in Western societies, though more complex, is strikingly similar.

In sum, the development of structural differentiation occurs along several different lines, partly in succession, and in part concurrently. The initial competition for participation time in newly forming groups turns into endeavors to prove oneself attractive to others and ultimately into competition for respect, power, and leadership. The group first allocates participation time differentially, then centers interaction disproportionately on some members, and successively differentiates respect, power, and dominance. Success at each step of differential allocation constitutes a competitive advantage for the next. Simultaneous with the increasing differentiation of social status, exchange relations become differentiated from competitive ones, be-

cause only those successful in the earlier competition for respect continue to compete for dominance, while the unsuccessful ones cease to compete with the successful members and instead offer compliance and support for their competition in exchange for instrumental services from them. Furthermore, role specialization develops, particularly in complex social structures, where a great variety of contributions are needed. Individuals who have been unsuccessful in their attempts to earn respect and power have incentives to find new ways of making contributions that would gain them superior status, and individuals in dominant positions have the power to assign specialized tasks to various others, both of which processes promote specialization.

A stratified system of differential status, however, involves more than differences in the respect and compliance various individuals command among others. The fact that one individual's ability and judgment are more widely respected in a group than another's means that the one is more highly esteemed than the other, but for these evaluations to crystallize into status differences requires that they be publicly acknowledged and that consensus is reached regarding them. As Homans put it: "In the early stages of the development of a group, several members may give one of their companions much social approval so that he is in fact enjoying high esteem, and yet no single member may have come to recognize what the others are doing."<sup>16</sup> Only the consensus that emerges among the rest of a group that the qualities of one member are worthy of high respect transforms their personal esteem of him into social status rooted in shared valuations, which implies that newcomers would be expected to accord him high respect even before they personally have acquired a high estimation of his qualities. Public recognition of the relative respect deserved by various members of the group makes the prestige structure a social reality independent of the attitudes of specific individuals. Our behavior to the President of the United States would undoubtedly reflect the high prestige he generally commands, whatever we personally may think of him. Consensus concerning the obligation to comply with the requests of a person similarly transforms his personal power into authoritative leadership, but analysis of this problem is deferred to chapter eight.

The stratification systems of entire communities, which consist of ranked classes rather than ranked individuals, exhibit still another

<sup>15</sup> Irving Goldman, "The Ifugao of the Philippine Islands," in Margaret Mead, *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937, pp. 153-179.

<sup>16</sup> George C. Homans, *Social Behavior*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961, p. 150.



way in which social status is grounded in public consensus that reflects the social structure, and so do organized hierarchies of authority. Once an individual is not only accepted by the members of a social class but is also recognized by outsiders as belonging to it, and perhaps even as having more or less social standing within it, the existing social agreement on the class ranking further secures his social status by rooting it in the class structure. For sheer membership in a social class, if generally acknowledged, bestows a certain prestige upon an individual.<sup>17</sup> Correspondingly, the institutionalized authority in a hierarchical order gives officials some authority simply on the basis of occupying a given office, as illustrated by military rank, although this authority is usually fortified and expanded in actual processes of interaction, as we shall see. In contrast to prestige and authority structures, power structures rest not primarily on social consensus concerning the privileges or rights that must be granted to the members of various strata but on the distribution of resources with which compliance with demands can be enforced.

A person of superior status in a group, who usually commands respect as well as compliance, exerts two types of influence, only one of which should be designated properly as power to impose his will on others. The respect others have for his judgment prompts them to follow his advice. The obligations they incur by accepting his contributions to their welfare induce them to reciprocate by complying with his directives. While these constitute two types of influence a person with superior status exerts, exception may be taken to Homans' conclusion concerning them: "In both cases, whether he gives them advice they take or orders they obey, the important point is that he controls their behavior; and the fact that a new occasion may call for his advising them jointly is a nonessential detail."<sup>18</sup> There is a crucial distinction between following advice and following orders, and orders are not simply joint advice, although there is a mixed case that involves both joint advice and directives.

If others follow a person's advice he influences them by enabling them to do something that is to their advantage, but if they follow his orders he influences them to do something that is to his advantage. Although their interests are served in both cases, they profit directly

<sup>17</sup> The existence of ranked social classes makes even low standing in any class except the lowest something for which people compete. Hence, most exchange relations between high status and low status individuals contribute to two different competitive systems—that among the highs, and that among the lows.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372.

from taking his competent advice, whereas they incur a cost by complying with his directives in order to profit from services he renders them in exchange, such as advice on their problems. The individual whose advice is accepted does not impose his will on others—if he were to advise them to do what he wants rather than what corresponds to his best judgment, his poor advice would soon be ignored—but the one whose orders are obeyed does; only the latter exercises power. Indeed, giving advice and issuing orders have opposite consequences; advising another creates obligations, while ordering him to do something uses them up, as it were, by enabling him to discharge his obligations through his compliance.<sup>19</sup>

The status implications of asking a person to perform a task depend largely on its effect on the imbalance of obligations. Homans conceptualized this differently: "If I ask you to do something I cannot do, I recognize you as my superior. . . . But if I ask you to do something that I can also do, and there are other valuable things I can do but you cannot, you are my inferior. . . ." <sup>20</sup> However, although I cannot clean house or iron or cook as well as our maid, I do not acknowledge her superiority by asking her to do it, since I pay her for it. If a person repeatedly asks another to do something that benefits himself, he becomes obligated to comply with the other's wishes, which means that he implicitly subordinates himself to the other's power by asking, *unless* he repays him for it, financially or otherwise. The assumption is that the maid's wages, given her needs, obligate her to perform services for and comply with the directives of her employer, and asking a person who is under obligation to one to do something does *not* imply subordination, or equality, for that matter.

If a group of individuals who work on a collective task regularly follow the good suggestions of one of them, thus marking him as their leader, a mixed situation exists. Carrying out his suggestions that advance their work benefits the entire group, those who accept them as well as the one who gives them. They are apt to continue to follow his lead, not only because his suggestions are respected, but also because the others become obligated to him for his contribution to their welfare, enabling him to make them accede to his wishes even when this is not to their immediate advantage. Since the leader

<sup>19</sup> On separate occasions Homans made essentially each of these two points: that his rewarding advice entitles a man later to tell others what to do (*loc. cit.*), and that their doing what he tells them reduces their debt to him (*ibid.*, p. 298). But the two points together conflict with his statements quoted above.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

benefits as much as the rest do from their following his good suggestions, rather than somebody else's poorer ones, the compliance his contributions earn him constitutes a surplus profit of leadership.

### *Status as Expendable Capital*

Status can be considered as capital, which an individual can draw on to obtain benefits, which is expended in use, and which can be expanded by profitably investing it at interest. Thus, sociable intercourse tends to occur predominantly among people whose social standing is roughly equal.<sup>21</sup> This is due in part to differences in style of life between social classes, which impede relaxed sociability between widely different classes, and in part to the deference owed superiors, which too hampers easy socializing. Sometimes, however, individuals are willing to put up with these discomforts, because they find it gratifying to be accepted by superiors as sociable companions. The striver is an extreme example of this tendency, although it should be noted that the individual who appears a striver is a poor one indeed, but few of us are entirely free of it. The person is rare who would not enjoy an invitation to a dinner at the White House. The fact that many people find it rewarding to associate with superiors means that those of superior status can furnish rewards, and expect a return for them, merely by associating with others of lower status.<sup>22</sup>

The same principle holds for power. The subordination of a person who has power over many others is more valuable than the subordination of one with little or no power, just as acceptance by a prestigious person is usually more highly valued than acceptance by one with little prestige. The subordination of a powerful person has a multiplier effect on the power of the one to whom he submits, since it usually carries with it the subordination of those over whom he has power. This is how power hierarchies that are not formally instituted emerge. In political conventions, for example, the delegate who has the power to deliver a large block of votes is a more valuable supporter of a candidate—that is, contributes more to a candidate's power

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 320–331, where several empirical findings in support of this statement are cited.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 366–370, and Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (2d ed.), University of Chicago Press, 1963, pp. 146–150. Similarly, since inferiors usually take the initiative in approaching superiors, “if you can get another man, hitherto considered your equal, to come to your office rather than your going to his, to discuss some problem, you are to that extent one-up on him.” Homans, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

—than the one who can only offer his own vote. The process may be more subtle and thus have still wider repercussions. The powerful delegate's reputation and the weight of his support may influence other delegates who are not pledged to him and who are not directly under his power to vote for the candidate to whom he throws his support.<sup>23</sup> Inasmuch as a powerful person's willingness to accept a subordinate position is more valuable than that of a powerless one, the powerful can expect more rewards for doing so than the powerless.

Status, like capital, is expended in use. An individual's prestige depends largely on his class position, that is, on the prestige of those who accept him and socialize with him as an equal. If he associates with persons of superior prestige on an egalitarian basis, this helps to raise his own, which is the reason it is rewarding to associate with prestigious people. By the same token, an individual who regularly socializes with others of inferior prestige is in danger of being considered by the community to be on their level and, hence, of losing prestige. The rewards he can obtain from socializing with social inferiors who prize associating with him—for instance, from the deference they accord him in social interaction—entails the possible cost of losing social standing. Correspondingly, the person who submits to another's power is not only no longer his own master but also indicates to others that his strength is not as great as they might have thought, which may well encourage them to comply less strictly with his requests in the future. These losses, in addition to his submission itself, are the price he pays for using his power over subordinates to obtain benefits from a superior.

There is, however, a more direct expenditure of power. By directing others to do what he wants, a person enables them to discharge their obligations to himself for whatever services he has rendered them, thereby depleting his power over them, although continuing services to them would replenish his power. Moreover, people submit to a superior's power because all other alternatives they have are still less attractive to them. By exercising power and making demands on subordinates, a superior makes remaining under his power less attractive and alternatives to it relatively more attractive than they were before, thus decreasing his subordinates' dependence on which his power rests.

<sup>23</sup> For an analysis of the circulation and expansion of influence and power, see Parsons, “On the Concept of Influence,” and James S. Coleman's “Comment,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (1963), 37–92, esp. pp. 72–73.

A person with a large capital can live on its interest without using up any of it, and the case of the person whose superior social status is pronounced and secure is analogous. The upper-class Brahmin can freely associate with middle-class friends should he find it rewarding, since his secure social position is not in the least endangered by doing so. But the parvenue who still seeks to prove that he belongs to the upper class must do so by socializing with others who evidently do belong and thus tends to be reluctant to risk his insecure social standing by being seen with middle-class associates. An interviewing study of psychiatrists (who were generally acknowledged to be the superior group), psychologists, and social workers found that psychiatrists of high status (measured by self-perceived power) thought more highly of psychologists and social workers and showed more interest in associating with them than low-status psychiatrists did.<sup>24</sup> Although the medical degree makes the position of psychiatrists immune to any threat by psychologists or social workers, it tends to require a secure status in the superior stratum to feel free to express approval of, and associate with, the members of the subordinate strata.

Superiors obtain much satisfaction from associating with inferiors, who usually look up to them and follow their suggestions. The rewards that high status yields are undoubtedly an incentive for engaging in social intercourse, which may be a main reason why socioeconomic status has been consistently found to be directly correlated with social participation, specifically, with membership in voluntary associations, active participation within them, and participation in discussions of various sorts.<sup>25</sup> But insecure superior status, which can be jeopardized by social contacts with others of lower status, puts pressure on individuals to forego these satisfactions. Only firmly grounded social standing enables a person to benefit from such social contacts without the risk of losing his superior status or some of it.

The case of power is again closely parallel. If an individual has

<sup>24</sup> Alvin Zander, Arthur R. Cohen, and Ezra Stotland, "Power and the Relations Among Professions," in Cartwright, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-34.

<sup>25</sup> On voluntary associations, see Mirra Komarowski, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," in Logan Wilson and William Kolb, *Sociological Analysis*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949, pp. 378-392; on unions, see William Spinrad, "Correlates of Trade Union Participation," *American Sociological Review*, 25 (1960), 237-244; on participation in discussions, see Fred L. Strodbeck, Rita M. James, and Charles Hawkins, "Social Status in Jury Deliberations," *American Sociological Review*, 22 (1957), 713-719, William A. Caudill, *The Psychiatric Hospital as a Small Society*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, pp. 243-252, 295-296, and Blau, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

much power over others, which means that they are obligated to and dependent on him for greatly needed benefits, they will be eager to do his bidding and anticipate his wishes in order to maintain his good will, particularly if there are still others who compete for the benefits he supplies them. If an individual has little power over others, however, they will be less concerned with pleasing him, and he may even have to remind them that they owe it to him to follow his requests.<sup>26</sup> Such reminders demonstrate to them that he really needs the services they render him, just as they need his services, which implies that the relation between him and them is not one of unequal power but one of egalitarian exchange. The power of accumulated obligations is depleted by asking others to repay their debts, because doing so transforms, at least in part, the power relations into exchange relations, which presume relative equality of status. Great inequality of power typically obviates the need for such reminders, and the profound obligations on which it rests cannot be fully repaid by the services furnished at any one time, thus keeping the others continually indebted. The great power produced by a large asset of obligations permits a person to live on its interest without depleting it. Indeed, if he is willing to risk some of it, he can increase it further.

An individual who has power over an entire group can coordinate their activities in the pursuit of various ends by telling each what to do. This principle underlies political government, formal organizations generally, and also the organizing activities of informal leaders. By giving orders to others and imposing his will upon them, the ruler or leader cashes in on some of the obligations they owe him for whatever services he has rendered and thus depletes his power. Actually, coordination often entails credit, that is, compliance with demands in excess of obligations.<sup>27</sup> But if the coordination is effective, it furthers the achievement of some goals, that is, it brings rewards that would not have been obtained otherwise. These rewards may be indivisible—a country's national strength, the trophy of the winning team—or allocated by outside authority—the earnings of the workers in a unit under the group incentive system. In these cases the benefits group members derive due to the leader's effectiveness more than

<sup>26</sup> Homans, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-299; on a gang leader's reluctance to call in the debts of his followers to him lest his dominant position suffer, see Whyte, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

<sup>27</sup> "Force alone can establish Power, habit alone can keep it in being, but to expand it it must have credit—a thing which, even in its earlier life, it finds useful and has generally received in practice." Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power*, New York: Viking, 1949, p. 25.

replenish his credit and their obligations to him, which were partly used up by their compliance with his directives. If the rewards are divisible, as illustrated by the income of the firm or the political offices of the winning party, the leader can distribute some of the extra benefits resulting from his contribution to his subordinates and still maintain a surplus for himself, increasing his power over subordinates while making special profits besides, whether they are financial or the highest political office. Should his guidance prove unrewarding, however, he will lose power over followers. If the leader has used up their obligations to him and they have nothing to gain by remaining under his direction, he will even cease to be their leader. Without having money to pay employees a person cannot remain their employer; without having patronage to dispense to "ward heelers" he cannot remain their political boss; without winning some contests for the gang he cannot remain its leader. It is by taking this risk of losing some or all his power that the superior earns surplus profits, in the form of increased power and other rewards, if the chances he takes pay off.<sup>28</sup> A person with great power can more easily risk some of it to gain more; hence the rich in power tend to get richer in power.

Very high status, firmly rooted in large resources and in the social structure, is a signal asset, the implications of which differ from those of slight superiority qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Superior status that empowers a person to command a variety of services from others enables him to gain many advantages. But if securing these advantages requires making too stringent demands, he depletes his power and endangers his status for several reasons. The costly services he forces others to supply to him may make it profitable for them to relinquish the benefits on which his power rests in favor of the lesser benefits that can be had from another person at lesser cost. If he must often prod others into furnishing services to him, moreover, it shows them that he is dependent on them and thus reduces his power over them. Finally, his exploitation of subordinates, though they may not be able to escape from it, may draw upon him community disapproval and weaken his position in the community at large. The distinctive asset of vast power is that it obviates the need for making excessive demands that undermine power. This means not merely that individuals or groups with much power still have a great deal left after using some of it, by commanding services, but that their exercise of power usually does not deplete it at all and often

actually helps them further to enhance it. For highly superior status and resources facilitate making profits by risking investments under conditions of uncertainty.

Great achievements are usually the result of having taken risks in striving for them. It is precisely when success is uncertain that it tends to be most highly valued and most generously rewarded. Knight has emphasized that profit, strictly speaking, is due to uncertainty and is the reward for assuming responsibility for uncertainty, that is, for risking investments whose return cannot be predicted with accuracy in advance.<sup>29</sup> People seem to prefer to be sure of the rewards they receive for the services they render and to be willing to pay a price for such security.<sup>30</sup> The entrepreneur provides this security by guaranteeing his employees certain rewards for their services and by assuming the responsibility for deciding on investments under conditions of uncertainty. The profits he reaps from the enterprise are his reward for having taken these risks. Leadership generally involves making decisions whose outcome is uncertain and furnishing services expected to (but not certain to) further the attainment of collective objectives. The increment in power the successful leader earns is his reward for having made these risky decisions and investments.

The larger the initial scope of a man's power, the easier it is for him to take the risks that are likely to augment his power. An important reason for this is the principle of insurance.<sup>31</sup> Although the outcome of any single decision may be quite uncertain, it is often possible to predict with a high degree of accuracy the statistical probability of the outcome of a large number of decisions of a given kind. For example, while it is difficult to estimate in advance whether a single employee is going to quit or not, the proportion of several thousands of employees who are likely to quit in any one year can often be predicted rather accurately on the basis of past experience. Whereas there is uncertainty concerning the single event or decision, there is virtually none concerning many events or decisions that can be grouped under a general category, since the proportion of unsuccessful ones can be predicted in advance and taken into account as part of the cost through some form of insurance. Given a knowledge of the proportion of unsuccessful outcomes—for example, warehouses annually destroyed by fire or quitting rate of experienced employees—

<sup>28</sup> Frank H. Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit* (2d ed.), Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1933, esp. chapters i, ii, and viii.

<sup>30</sup> See Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man*, New York: Wiley, 1957, pp. 183–195.

<sup>31</sup> Knight, *op. cit.*, chapter vii.

<sup>28</sup> Homans, *op. cit.*, pp. 296–297.

the man with a large number of investments can completely assure himself against loss and does not operate under uncertainty at all, but this knowledge does not relieve the man with a single investment of uncertainty (unless he buys insurance from another with sufficiently large investments to provide it). The man with one investment risks it and may lose all, while the man with many investments discounts a proportionate loss and assumes, in fact, no risk. In other words, the sheer scope of a man's operations or power decreases the risk involved in assuming what is, in absolute terms, the same amount of risk. The consequent security of individuals with much power and resources makes them less responsive to social pressures but also more tolerant toward inferiors and outsiders than are those whose superior status rests on less secure foundations.

"In the South the master is not afraid to raise the slave to his own standing, because he knows that he can reduce him in a moment to the dust at his pleasure. In the North the white no longer distinctly perceives the barrier that separates him from the degraded race, and he shuns the Negro with the more pertinacity since he fears lest they should some day be confounded together."<sup>32</sup> If this observation of de Tocqueville does not exactly correspond to the situation any more, it is because Negroes are no longer slaves and the advances they have made in the last century, disappointingly small though they are in view of our democratic values, have made them a threat to the superior status of the whites in the South, except to those in the highest social strata, who are generally more tolerant toward Negroes than lower-class Southerners. A group's tolerant attitude toward, and encouragement of, the efforts of another group to raise its power and social standing requires that the first group's secure social status is not endangered by these efforts.<sup>33</sup> There is something smug about tolerance, despite best intentions, since it implicitly asserts one's own superiority.<sup>34</sup> Our attitudes toward opponents and deviants, too, can

<sup>32</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, New York: Vintage, 1954, Vol. I, 374.

<sup>33</sup> See de Jouvenel, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-346.

<sup>34</sup> John Updike illustrates this aspect of tolerance nicely in a story about a conversation the only white woman resident on an island has with the husband of one of the few white tourist couples there. Thus, the woman talks about his wife and the attitude of the Negro inhabitants to her: "You see how dark she is," she explained. "How tan. . . . They say your wife's being part Negro has kept you out of the hotels on the better islands." Later, wondering about his defensiveness in answer to this remark, the husband reflects what the attitude of his progressive wife would have been: "His seriousness had been unworthy of her.

remain permissive only as long as we do not feel threatened by them; once their actions are experienced as a threat, we can hardly help becoming intolerant toward them, often fiercely so.

The social conditions of tolerance can be illustrated by the difference between what might be called the "psychiatric" and the "political" orientation toward offenders of basic values. The psychiatric orientation toward delinquents conceives of them as individuals with personality problems who should be helped and not punished. Although such an orientation is most appropriate for the sex deviant, the parents of children immediately threatened by his activities can rarely muster such a tolerant attitude toward him, not to speak of the parents of children who have actually been attacked by him. Hitler was undoubtedly a person who, though not insane, had serious personality defects that deserved psychiatric treatment. But the Jews, and later most of the world, could not and did not think of him as a pitiful neurotic who should be cared for but as a dangerous foe who should be crushed. The power he held to subjugate people had to be taken seriously, which made any psychiatric understanding of his maladjusted personality completely irrelevant and required instead a political orientation to him as an opponent. This extreme illustration serves to highlight the principle that for people to be tolerant of the actions of others, the latter must not have the power to subjugate them or to endanger their security; if they do, intolerance is required to avert the threat.

Intolerance is an admission of weakness that acknowledges the power of another, just as tolerance is a sign of strength that confirms the other's inferiority. Power over others is greatly desired by many men, since it is a generalized means with the aid of which a large variety of objectives can be accomplished, and since the ability to impose one's will on others often comes to be valued in its own right. A man can demonstrate his power to himself and to the world by forcing others to take his threats seriously. By treating the juvenile delinquent as a boy in need of rehabilitation, we deny his claim to being a strong man through our condescending tolerance. We cannot remain equally permissive in the face of the gangster or fascist

She would have wanted him to say yes, her grandfather picked cotton in Alabama, in America these things are taken for granted, we have no problem. But he saw, like something living glimpsed in a liquid volume, that the comedy of this response depended upon, could only live within, a vast unconscious pride of race." "The Doctor's Wife," in *Pigeon Feathers*, New York: Knopf, 1962, pp. 208-209.

The -j.c. is also treated as a threat. Rehabilitation is one



hoodlum, who poses a more serious threat to our lives and fortunes and freedom, yet our intolerant opposition to him in attempts to suppress him serves to validate the power that he craves. The gangster's or fascist's power over followers has its source in the rewards they derive from following him, whether these are material or ideological, and their willingness to do his bidding gives him coercive power in the community. Endeavors to suppress his power, as long as they are unsuccessful, confirm and reinforce it, for they show others the apparent futility of resistance and tempt them to submit to him. Power is undeniable, and its serious threats must be opposed, but unsuccessful opposition further strengthens it.

### *Conclusions*

Imbalances of obligations incurred in social transactions produce differences in power. Unreciprocated, recurrent benefits obligate the recipient to comply with the requests of the supplier and thus give the latter power over the former. The conditions of power are defined by the four basic alternatives to it. One method for obtaining needed benefits from a person who can furnish them is to provide services he needs in return. This raises the problems of the exchange processes that develop and of the distribution of resources in a community that governs them and is modified by them. A second possibility is to obtain the needed benefits from another source. Tracing the implications of this alternative leads to the study of competitive processes, of the exchange rates that become established in social structures, and of monopolization. Third, benefits can be secured by force. This fact calls attention to the differentiation of power in a group or society, to the organizations in which power is mobilized, and to political processes and institutions. Fourth, benefits can be renounced and the need for them can be overcome, notably when identification with profound ideals makes material satisfactions appear relatively insignificant. The implications here point toward the analysis of common values, changing needs, and the emergence of ideologies in various social situations.

The four conditions of power are circumscribed by the absence of these four alternatives. If men have insufficient resources, if no satisfactory alternatives are available to them, if they cannot use coercive force, and if their needs are pressing, a person or group who can supply benefits that meet these needs attains power over them. Under these conditions, their subordination to his power is inescapable,

since he can make the fulfillment of essential needs contingent on their compliance.

Differentiation of power arises in the course of competition for scarce goods. In informal groups, the initial competition is for participation time, which is scarce, and which is needed to obtain any social reward from group membership. In communities the primitive competition is for scarce means of livelihood. At first, all members of the collectivity compete against all others, but as status differences emerge in consequence of differential success in the initial competition, the object of the competition changes, and exchange relations become differentiated from competitive ones. Those successful in the earlier stages of competition tend to compete later for dominant positions and, in communities, for movement into higher social classes, while the unsuccessful ones cannot compete with them for dominance but become their exchange partners, who receive instrumental benefits in exchange for subordination and status support. In class structures of communities, the exchange relations between members of different classes or substrata complement and support their respective competitive struggles for social status. Public recognition that a person belongs to a given stratum in the hierarchy of classes consolidates his social status.

Not all types of influence reflect power to impose one's will on another. Inducing a person to render a service by rewarding him for doing so does not involve exercising power over him, unless continuing rewards obligate him not only to furnish services but also to comply with directives. Moreover, a person whose advice others follow influences them without imposing his will on them. In contrast, the person whose orders others follow does exercise power over them. His orders prompt them to do what he wants, whereas his advice permits them to do better what they want. His advice benefits them and thus obligates them to him; it does not entail the exercise of power, though it may well be a source of power. On the other hand, their compliance with his orders benefits him and thus discharges their obligations to him; it does entail an exercise of power, and it depletes the power in the process.

Power is expended in use, but it can be invested at some risk to yield more power. A person who calls on others to discharge their obligations to him reveals his dependence on their services and weakens his power over them. But if a man has much power, he need not remind subordinates, who are eager to maintain his good will, to discharge their obligations, and he can use his power to organize

their activities more effectively to achieve various objectives. The benefits that accrue to them due to his effective leadership further obligate others to him and strengthen his power over them. This increment in power is his reward for taking the risks of leadership, for leadership entails the danger of losing power should its guidance fail to bring additional rewards.

A firmly established, secure social status that is not endangered by efforts of others to improve theirs is a prerequisite for tolerant encouragement of these efforts. To be sure, democratic values demand that all people have the opportunity to improve their social status and that they are free to organize political opposition in attempts to achieve political power. Institutional restraints are needed to protect these opportunities and freedoms, however, because groups whose social standing and power is endangered by the economic and political endeavors of others cannot be expected to look upon them with tolerant benevolence but are likely to meet these threats to themselves with intolerant opposition. It is the duty of those citizens of a democratic society who are not immediately involved in particular power struggles to help safeguard equality of opportunity and political tolerance, since the involvement of the participants makes them incapable of doing so.

## \* SIX

### *Expectations*

Oft expectation fails, and most oft there  
Where most it promises.

SHAKESPEARE, *All's Well that Ends Well*

The satisfactions human beings experience in their social associations depend on the expectations they bring to them as well as on the actual benefits they receive in them. The man who expects much from his associates is more easily disappointed in them than the one who expects little, and the same degree of friendliness might attract the first man to other people and discourage the second from associating with them. These expectations of social rewards, in turn, are based on the past social experience of individuals and on the reference standards they have acquired, partly as the result of the benefits they themselves have obtained in the past and partly as the result of learning what benefits others in comparable situations obtain.

The fact that an individual derives outstanding rewards from associating with others increases his attraction to them, his dependence on them, and, in the long run, his level of expectation concerning what constitutes satisfactory social relations. The superior gratifications that attract an individual to some associates simultaneously make other associates comparatively unattractive, thereby making him dependent on those who provide superior gratifications. The group whose acceptance is more rewarding than any other's creates such dependence, as does the girl whose love is most rewarding, and the employer whose job is most rewarding. As people become accustomed to a certain level of social gratification, which they may have